2CLPERESEARCHPAPERSERIES[VOL. 06NO.02 there is something about sovereignty that has not been replaced by alternative political and legalsystems.Fornow,thesovereignstatepersistsasthebasisofpoliticalandlegalsystems. 6 If we can agree that state sovereignty remains a vital part of international relations and internationallawinthetwenty-firstcentury,weshouldalsobeabletoadmitthatweneeda workingvocabularytodiscussandanalyzewhatitis.Theremayhavebeenatimewhenthe classicconceptualizationofsovereigntyinthetraditionofBodinorHobbes-basedontheideal thatleadersofdiscreteterritorialentitiesexcludeallexternalactorsfromdomesticgovernment decision making-was a satisfactory description, but in a world where both the United Sates andFijiaresovereign,weneedamorenuancedvocabularytoday. 7 The recent resurgence of sovereignty scholarship reflects a shared sense that no matter how overusedandvaguethetermsovereigntyis,itremainsacriticalpartofinternationallegaland political relations. Our world is highly interdependent (as we know from crises in our capital markets, environment, technology). 8 One could be forgiven for thinking that the most importantmattersspanallnationalboundaries,andyetthesovereignstateremainsthebasis forallinternationalrelations.Yet,asJensBartelsonhaspointedout,"modernpoliticalscience oftentestifiestoitsowninabilitywhenittriestocometotermswiththeconceptandrealityof sovereignty;itisasifwecannotdotoourcontemporaneitywhatBodin,HobbesandRousseau didtotheirs." 9 Wehavenot"cometoterms"withsovereigntybecausewehaven'ttried,butbecausewehave notapproacheditasboththelegalandpoliticalsubjectthatitis.Contemporaryuniversities dividethestudyoflawandpoliticsintodifferentdepartments(evenentirelydifferentschools), leavingthosesubjectsthatspanbothdisciplinesinadequatelystudied.Politicalscientistsmay be too skeptical that international law has any weight in international relations, and legal scholars may not be skeptical enough. There must be some middle ground for studying sovereigntyfromboththeperspectiveofpoliticsandlaw.JeanBodinwasbothajuristanda politicalphilosopher,aswasCarlSchmitt,AlexanderHamiltonandJohnJay. Inthisproject,I wanttobegintore-integratelegalandpoliticaltheoriestostudysovereignty.Thispaperisa modest first step in a larger effort to provide an empirical study of how sovereignty is conceptualized in international legal discourse and what sovereignty means in terms of internationalrelationstheoriesconcerningbindingstatesandinternationalpoliticalstructure.
6 ThomasJ.BierstekerandCynthiaWeber,StateSovereigntyasSocialConstruct3(1996) . 7 StephenD.Krasner,Sovereignty:OrganizedHypocrisy20(1999).
8 ThomasM.Franck,TheShiftingAllocationofAuthorityinInternationalLaw:ConsideringSovereignty,Supremacy andSubsidiarity20-21(TomerBroudeandYuvalShanyeds.,2008) . 9 JensBartelson, Agenealogyofsovereignty1(1995) . HereIprovideananalysisofadvisoryopinionsandcontentiouscasesbeforetheInternational CourtofJustice(the"I.C.J.")intheperiodsincetheendoftheColdWar. Thisresearchcontributestoageneralunderstandingofcontemporarysovereigntyintwomain ways: Firstly, the study demonstrates that sovereignty is not a static characteristic resulting necessarily from certain power configurations, but rather is a bundle of rights and responsibilities that vary according tobothdomesticandglobalcontext.Secondly, thestudy provides a taxonomy of "ideal types" based on lines of I.C.J. cases that help organize our discussion of sovereignty. The I.C.J. decisions fall into three categories (or ideal types) of sovereignty:(1)ThePrince,asthefinalandsupremepowerofthestaterequiringnolegalor politicaljustification,(2)TheProtector,asstatepowerjustifiedbythestate'sabilitytoprotect itsowncitizensfrombothinternalandexternalthreats,and(3)TheCitizen,aspowergranted bycitizensandtheinternationalcommunityinreturnforacceptingcertainnormsandfulfilling certainresponsibilities. Id.at34-5. Third, the Court rejected the argument that the United Nations Charter (the "Charter") prohibited the use of nuclear weapons. 32 The Court held that states have the right to selfdefense and reprisal-even with nuclear weapons-as long as that self-defense and reprisal conformtotheproportionalityrule(thatis,thattheresponsetoanattackisproportionateto theattackitself). 33 Finally, the Court dismissed customary law as prohibiting states from using nuclear weapons, despiteaGeneralAssemblyresolutionproclaimingtheirillegality. …thefirstoftheresolutionsoftheGeneralAssemblyexpresslyproclaimingtheillegalityofthe useofnuclearweapons,resolution1653(XVI)of24November1961(mentionedinsubsequent resolutions),afterreferringtocertaininternationaldeclarationsandbindingagreements,from theDeclarationofSt.Petersburgof1868totheGenevaProtocolof1925,proceededtoqualify the legal nature of nuclear weapons, determine their effects, and apply general rules of customaryinternationallawtonuclearweaponsinparticular. 38 Second, despite the requests by a number of powerful states for the Court to use its discretionary power to decline the case, the Court chose to provide an advisory opinion. By providing this opinion, the Court has supported the Citizen version of sovereignty insofar as the Court's action supports the cause of international legal proceduralism. In other words, even though the strict holding is that the current state of internationallawdoesnotgenerallyprohibittheuseofnuclearweaponsbystates,thefactthat thereisaholdingsuggeststhatevenquestionsthatgototheheartofsovereigntyaresubject tointernationallaw. This conceptualization is a powerful argument for sovereignty because it appeals to thebasichumandesiretoprotectone'sselffromharm,butinthemostrecentcasesdiscussed below, the Court has rejected protection as a legitimate reason to justify a state breaching international obligations. There is tension between this line of cases and the Prince line of cases because, one the one hand, the Court accepts that sovereignty endows states with the powertowagenuclearwartodefenditselfandtherighttorejectthejurisdictionoftheI.C.J.in order to protect and manage the environment for fishing, but on the other hand, the Court rejects a state's right to build a wall to protect its citizens from an acknowledged terrorist threat and denies another state's right to reject a Soviet-era contract in order to protect the environment. There is no simple way to explain the discrepancy between the two lines of cases. The apparent logical inconsistency is not likely to be resolved by the I.C.J. or by prevailingnormsofstatebehavior.Rather,Ithink,thetensionbetweenthelogicinthePrince and the Protector underscores the importance of developing a functioning vocabulary to describecompetingconceptualizationsofsovereignty. 57 The Court found that Israel's construction of a wall was contrary to applicableinternationallaw. 58 ThiscasesetsthebarextremelyhighfortheProtector.AlthoughtheCourtmadereferenceto the importance that a state protect its citizens, the standard a state must meet in order to comply with international norms and conventions in this case were too high for Israel to demonstratethatbuildingawallintheOccupiedTerritorycomportedwiththosenorms.
II.THECASES

FISHERIES JURISDICTION CASE (SPAIN
LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF
2.CASECONCERNINGTHEGABCÍKOVO-NAGYMAROSPROJECT(HUNGARY/SLOVAKIA)
The question before the Court in this 1997 decision was whether Hungary was entitled to suspend (and later abandon) the work on the Nagymoros Project and part of the Gabcíkovo project,whichcombinedwerepartofalargebarrageprojectontheriverDanubeinitiatedby the Budapest Treaty of 1977 between Czechoslovakia and Hungary to prevent catastrophic floods, to improve sailing quality and to produce clear electricity. Hungary argued that the suspension was justified by a "state of ecological necessity." 59 Slovakia, in response, argued thatthestateofnecessityHungaryreliedupon"didnotconstituteareasonforthesuspension ofatreatyobligationrecognizedbythelawoftreaties." 60 The disagreement between the two states was straightforward and the Court simply applied the standards necessary for showing a state of necessity as defined by Article 33 of the International Law Commission. In order to meet that standard, Hungary must demonstrate that (1) there was an essential interest of the state which conflicts with its international obligations,(2)therelevantinterestwasthreatenedby"graveandimminentperil"and(3)the act being questioned was the "only means" the state had of safeguarding the essential state interest. 61 Although the Court acknowledged that safeguarding ecological interests was an essential interestofallstates,thedangerposedbythebarrageoftheDanubewasnotimminentin1989 whenHungarysuspendeditsworkontheproject. C.THECITIZEN Asocietyofstates(orinternationalsociety)existswhenagroupofstates,consciousofcertain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive of themselvestobeboundbyacommonsetofrulesintheirrelationswithoneanotherandshare intheworkingsofcommoninstitutions.
63 AtthecoreoftheCitizenistheideathatthestateisboundbythenormsandrulesofalarger community of states and people within the state's own borders. The state as Citizen is antithetical to both an anarchical and hierarchical international structure. That is to say, sovereigntythatreliesoncitizenshipinasocietyofstatesdoesnotallowforanystate-even the most powerful-to reject international norms. States are bound by norms of the larger internationalcommunity offellowstatesaswellasobligationstocitizenslivingwithinstates' own borders. Sovereignty, that is the ultimate power to decide, does not reside in the state government structure, but rather is dispersed in the people as a whole (and their collective right to elect their officials and, in the extreme, to revolt) and the community of states who collectively recognize a state as a member of the international community (and hence a "sovereignstate")ornotdependingonwhetherastatecompliesgenerallywiththenormsand responsibilities generally agreed upon by the international community of sovereign states. Deudneydescribessuchapoliticalstructureas"negarchy"becausethestructureisdefinedby whatitnegatesratherthanwhatitallows.Inotherwords,anegarchyisasystemthatprevents certainactionsbybindingactors. Negarchyisthearrangementofinstitutionsneededtopreventsimultaneouslytheemergence of hierarchy and anarchy. In a workable negarchy, the particular configurations of negatives varywiththerelativestrengthsofmultiplethreats,buttheantithesistohierarchyandanarchy remainsconstant.Understoodthisway,negarchyisathird-andliberal-structuralprincipleof politicalorder,alongwithhierarchyandanarchy. 64 63 HedleyBull,TheAnarchicalSociety13(1977) .
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DanielDeudney,StateSovereigntyasSocialConstruct205(ThomasJ.BierstekerandCynthiaWebereds.) (1996) .
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Deudney argues that the early American history (between the establishment of the Union beginning in 1781 and the American Civil Was ending in 1865) provides a robust example of such a negarchical system.
65
The Philadelphian system, with its "American emphasis on laws and procedures to resolve conflicts and allocate goods," relied on the practice of legal procedurestomoderateanarchicaldynamics.
66 Evenincasesofterritorialdisputes,anareaof "hard politics" notorious for upsetting even the most liberal structures, Deudney argues that during the negarchical period of American history, legal proceduralism took precedence of violenceasamethodforresolvingconflicts.Onecasehedescribesconcernedaconflictover territory in northeastern Pennsylvania between Connecticut and Pennsylvania resulting from overlappingchartergrants.Althoughtherehadbeensomeviolentskirmishesbetweenthetwo states,bothPennsylvaniaandConnecticutacceptedanadhoclegalarbitrationsetupinNew Jersey. Since the 1990's, the majority of the cases the Court has decided underscore the developing importanceofstatesbindingthemselvesinanascentnegarchicalstructure.Thecasesinthis line is varied but they share two central themes (1) the court asserts its legal authority in defining state responsibilities and (2) 
LAGRAND CASE (GERMANY V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
This 2001 case concerns two German nationals who had been put to death in Arizona after having been found guilty of murder. The German nationals were brothers, Karl and Walter BernhardLaGrand,whohadbeenfoundguiltyofkillingamanandseverelyinjuringawoman duringthecourseofrobbingabankinArizona.ThebrothershadbeenborninGermany,but although they had lived in the United States since they were very young, they had never acquired United States citizenship. As foreign nationals, they were consequently entitled to contact their consulate under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (the "ViennaConvention"). Germany asked the Court to declare, among other things, that (1) the United States violated theViennaConventionbynotnotifyingtheGermanconsulateoftheLaGrandbrothers'arrest, (2) certain U.S. legal rules make it impossible for foreign states to raise lack of consular notificationunderU.S.lawand(3)theUnitedStatesviolateditsinternationallegalobligations byfailingtotakeallpossiblemeasuretoensurethattheLaGrandbrotherswerenotexecuted pendingafinaldecisionintheI.C.J.caseconcerningthebrothers.TheUnitedStatesapologized to Germany for not notifying Germany and instituted certain precautionary measures to preventasimilarrecurrence,butaskedtheCourtotherwisetodismissGermany'sclaims. 80 Thecasearoseinthefirstplacebecausetherewassomeconfusionoverthenationalityofthe LaGrand brothers from the time they were arrested.
81 Apparently, the brothers had been adopted by an American and "had the demeanor and speech of Americans rather than Germans." 82 TheUnitedStatesarguedthatnotonlydidthebrothersnotidentifythemselvesas Germans, but also that the brothers themselves were unaware that they were not U.S. nationals.
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The brothers' court appointed counsel did not raise non-compliance with the ViennaConventioninthedefenseanddidnotcontacttheGermanconsularauthorities. 84 Even during the lengthy period of appeals after conviction, no one notified German consular authorities and the brothers' attorneys did not raise the issue of failing to notify German consular authorities as required by the Vienna Convention. 88 TheU.S.SupremeCourtheldthatitlackedjurisdictionwithrespecttoGermany's complaint against Arizona due to the eleventh amendment of the U.S. constitution, which prohibitsfederalcourtsfromhearinglawsuitsofforeignstatesagainstaU.S.state.Regarding Germany's claim against the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held the doctrine of procedural default was not incompatible with the Vienna Convention and that even if procedural default did conflict with the Vienna Convention it had been overruled by later federal law-the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which explicitly legislatedthedoctrineofproceduraldefault. TheUnitedStatesDepartmentofStateconveyedtheI.C.J.'sordertotheGovernorofArizona without comment. The Arizona clemency board recommended a stay of execution to the governor on the basis of the I.C.J. provisional measure. The governor of Arizona ignored the recommendationandbothbrotherswereexecuted. TheI.C.J.heldinGermany'sfavorthat(1)theUnitedStateshadviolateditsobligationsunder paragraph 1(b) of the Vienna Convention when it failed to inform Germany's consular authoritiesthatithaddetainedGermannationals;
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